Newly declassified information from the Israel Defense Forces reveals that the military identified Hamas military chief Muhammad Deif and other senior commanders entering underground tunnels on the night before the October 7, 2023, attack. This movement was part of at least five distinct warning signs of unusual activity in the Gaza Strip that were noted by Israeli intelligence prior to the onslaught.
Until Wednesday, most of these indicators remained classified. The only anomaly previously cleared for public release involved the activation of dozens of Israeli SIM cards held by terrorists within Hamas’s elite Nukhba force. On Wednesday, security officials authorized the disclosure of additional signs, including the removal of tarps from rocket-launching shafts and various movements within Hamas’s anti-tank missile array.
Around midnight between October 6 and 7, intelligence indicated that Deif’s emergency underground command center had been activated. In response, the military directed a surveillance drone originally flying over the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. The goal was to determine if Deif himself had entered the site or if it was one of his aides. While it is now confirmed that Deif did enter the subterranean facility, the drone was unable to verify his presence in real time during the early morning hours.
The anomalous signs prompted the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency to deploy an elite counterterror force known as a Tequila team to the Gaza border. This unit, composed of Shin Bet fighters and members of the police’s Yamam unit, was placed on alert to operate advanced capabilities unrelated to a standard terrorist infiltration scenario.
Some Shin Bet officials at the time viewed the activity at the emergency compound as a potential opportunity to eliminate Deif, provided his presence could be confirmed. However, the military investigation into the failures of that night found that several of the anomalies had alternative explanations or were not considered strong enough indications of an imminent threat on their own.
Intelligence officers also received signs suggesting that Hamas was maintaining its expected routine activity. While individual signs had occurred in the past, the accumulation of these events that night was unusual. Numerous checks were conducted to confirm or refute plans for an attack, with some signs dismissed and others remaining open. No officer interpreted the data as indicating that something significant would happen immediately.
The investigation concluded that if top officers had viewed the full intelligence picture, they might have decided to raise the alert level for a pinpoint Hamas attack, though not for an all-out war. The military’s decision-making and conduct were largely based on years of false assessments regarding Hamas, leading to a failure to provide a clear warning across all levels of intelligence.
The October 7 attack resulted in the deaths of more than 1,200 people in Israel, mostly civilians, and the kidnapping of 251 others. It launched a war in Gaza that continued until a ceasefire in October 2025, which has largely held despite ongoing violence. Deif, who led the military wing for years and survived several assassination attempts, was killed in a strike in Khan Younis in July 2024.
