Israel's election results gave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a better showing than expected, but they still leave his bloc in the minority. He has no clear way to avoid another round of elections without striking a deal with Yashar leader Gadi Eisenkot. The deadlock may also affect whether Israel resumes its conflict with Iran.
In recent weeks, Netanyahu was seriously weighing a renewed campaign against Tehran. Opposition from US President Donald Trump and IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir appears to have held him back, although he may also have wanted Iran to believe an attack was possible in order to discourage provocations. Both objections were limited in time. Zamir opposed a strike before Israel's vote, held the previous day, and Trump opposed one before the US midterm elections on November 3.
Trump has repeatedly hinted at resuming strikes on Iran soon after the midterms. In his endorsement of Netanyahu, he also referred to wanting Israel involved again.
Had Eisenkot won the head-to-head contest between the blocs, as polls forecast, he might have started forming a government before the midterms, and it would have been doubtful that Netanyahu could order a new attack. Instead, Yisrael Beytenu leader Avigdor Liberman, an ally of Eisenkot, will not begin serious coalition talks before Friday, when final results are in. He must then choose between a deal with the Israeli-Arab parties, a deal with Netanyahu, or a second election, and any of those paths would lead to lengthy negotiations over terms and then over ministries. Such talks usually take weeks or months, far more than the four days between Friday and the midterms. Netanyahu would therefore likely be free to attack if Trump wants it or would not block it.
Zamir supports an attack under two conditions: Iran is about to strike Israel, or Trump restarts the war first and Israel has full US backing, offensively and defensively. He is also ready to act if Iran rebuilds its threat capabilities too quickly, which has not happened, or if a strike were part of a considered strategy to push Tehran toward key nuclear concessions to the US. He opposed acting before the election so that an Iranian missile counterstrike would not disrupt voting, and to avoid any suggestion that an attack was meant to help Netanyahu. With the vote over, nothing bars a strike, but Zamir is not rushing toward one. He does not see Tehran as much closer to a significant nuclear or ballistic missile threat, since both were set back by years through US-Israeli strikes in June 2026 and early 2026.
The main obstacle for Netanyahu is therefore Trump. He avoided an attack before the midterms because the Iran war is already dragging down him and the Republican Party in the polls. After the midterms, and unable to seek a third term, he will be less constrained. Still, most of his top advisers oppose a return to war. Some believe a few days of fighting might loosen Iran's position, while others note that Iran has refused to crack since February. Some have also warned that Tehran has kept firing even after a US ceasefire, so a new round could last longer than a few days.
Trump could instead continue slowly wearing Iran down economically. He has swung between economic pressure, sudden threats of war and retreat several times, including in August and earlier in October, which probably weakened his threats in Iranian eyes. Alternatively, Iran could become alarmed by his latest threat and offer a real nuclear deal, which would delay any attack.
If Trump does favor striking, the timing would suit Netanyahu. A war focus could shift national attention to where he prefers it just as Eisenkot's camp tries to unite. It might be harder for them to reach a deal with the Israeli-Arab parties while missiles fall on Israelis. They might also be more open to dealing with Netanyahu if Iran displaced October 7 and haredi military service as the main topics of public debate.
A strike could still be justified on its own terms, in theory as a way to extract nuclear concessions, and many Israelis would say the country should not miss a chance to act alongside the US. But with Zamir in no hurry, Netanyahu would need more than vague claims of new Iranian progress. It would be hard to say he removed the nuclear and missile threats and then argue that time is running out. How he explains a third round of conflict during coalition talks will be crucial to its legitimacy among the wider public.
