The Philippines had aimed to finalize a code of conduct for the South China Sea during its 2026 ASEAN presidency, but the goal was abandoned at the recent summit in Manila. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro stated that while approximately 80 percent of the text had been negotiated, the most critical areas of dispute remained unresolved. This outcome marked a missed opportunity for a breakthrough in the region's diplomatic relations.

The South China Sea is a vital global shipping lane, rich in fishing resources and potential oil and gas reserves. It has become a focal point for strategic competition. China claims a large portion of the sea through its Nine-Dash Line, a claim that overlaps with the territorial assertions of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. The proposed code of conduct is designed to establish rules for interaction and prevent minor incidents from escalating into larger conflicts.

Experts suggest that the primary obstacle is China’s reluctance to accept a legally binding agreement. Andreas Ufen, a Southeast Asia expert at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, noted that China possesses supreme power in the region and has little interest in imposing restrictions on itself. As long as Beijing can pursue its interests without such constraints, it sees little incentive to commit to a rigid legal framework.

The definition of the code's geographic scope also presents significant challenges. For example, the Paracel Islands, known as Xisha in China and Hoang Sa in Vietnam, are a point of contention. Hanoi seeks to include them in the code, while China rejects this inclusion. Felix Heiduk, head of the Asia research division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, highlighted that there is still no consensus on whether the final document should carry legal weight.

The negotiation process has been ongoing for 12 years without major progress. Beyond China, several ASEAN member states have reservations about a binding treaty because it would require domestic ratification under international law. A non-binding code, by contrast, would serve only as a voluntary declaration of intent. The definition of what constitutes an incident is also debated, with questions remaining about whether coast guard actions like water cannons or blockades are covered.

Internal divisions within ASEAN further complicate the process. The 11 member states are not unified in their approach. The Philippines and Vietnam are vocal in their opposition to China, while Malaysia and Indonesia adopt a more restrained stance. Cambodia and Laos, which have close economic ties with Beijing and no territorial claims in the sea, often align with Chinese interests. This lack of unity makes it difficult to reach the consensus required for a unified position.

China appears to prefer keeping the conflict at a simmering level, allowing it to strengthen its position without limiting its maneuverability. Ufen believes Beijing strategically favors bilateral negotiations with individual countries rather than dealing with a united ASEAN group. This approach allows China to exploit the discord among its neighbors and maintain a strategic advantage.

A recent study by the Yusof Ishak Institute suggests that internal ASEAN divisions, not just Chinese resistance, have stalled the negotiations. The authors recommend focusing on partial agreements regarding crisis communication and maritime environment protection as initial steps. They also suggest developing the 2002 non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties as an intermediate measure before attempting a comprehensive treaty.

The American Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that the hardest sticking points remain unresolved despite any progress made this year. Negotiations will continue in 2027 under Singapore's chairmanship. The success of future talks will depend on whether China is willing to accept regulations that limit its actions and whether ASEAN can overcome its internal disagreements to present a united front.

The dilemma for ASEAN nations is clear. A highly binding agreement risks failing due to reservations from China and specific member states. Conversely, a weak, non-binding code may create an illusion of consensus without significantly changing behavior at sea. Experts warn that even if a code is eventually signed, it will regulate incident management but will not eliminate the underlying territorial disputes.