Sharp disagreements between the Mossad and the Israel Defense Forces over policy toward Iran have returned as the norm, sources told The Jerusalem Post, ending a period of relative unity within the Israeli defense establishment that lasted from 2023 to 2025.

The most recent dispute centered on how aggressively to push for a joint US-Israel operation against Iran ahead of Israeli elections. Mossad Director Roman Gofman favored the move, backing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir opposed it.

Despite that rift, sources close to the Mossad told the Post that Channel 12 reports claiming Gofman had supported an operation in the recent period were false. They described the general lines of debate instead: Gofman is most concerned about taking advantage of a joint offensive opportunity with the United States against Iran before that window closes, while Zamir worries that an attack during a sensitive election season could damage the legitimacy of any operation and could be exploited by Netanyahu against his political rivals.

The sources stressed that the debates are not black and white. There are circumstances in which Zamir would support a strike on Iran and others in which Gofman might oppose one, though the positions described reflect the broad contours of the argument.

The two bodies were not always divided. In June 2025 and again in early 2026, both the IDF and the Mossad supported major operations against Iran. There were some disagreements in June 2025 over which agency would take the lead on certain matters, but the sides eventually reached an understanding. In 2023 and 2024, both favored taking more time to prepare fully for striking a wide range of Iranian targets before launching a major attack.

Differences emerged over the goals of the early 2026 operation. Then Mossad director David Barnea pushed hard for regime change, advancing several practical plans that involved the Kurds and, according to foreign sources, former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The IDF opposed those plans or was lukewarm toward them. In general, the IDF has been more skeptical that regime change is achievable in the short or medium term, while the Mossad, under both Barnea and Gofman, has been more optimistic.

The divide stretches back further. In June 2022, the Mossad and the IDF debated whether a return to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, was a wise strategy. In 2018, the Mossad favored convincing the United States to withdraw from the agreement, while the IDF preferred to remain in the deal at least until close to 2024, when some of its limits, which Iran was observing at the time, were set to expire.

From 2010 to 2012, the two agencies united against possible plans by Netanyahu and then defense minister Ehud Barak to attack Iran's nuclear program, arguing that such a strike would drag the region into danger and chaos long before Iran was actually close to a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu and Barak countered that without an attack, nuclear material would be moved to the underground Fordow facility, which would put it beyond Israel's ability to strike without American assistance, something considered doubtful at the time.